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Abstract We experimentally study how receiving information about tax compliance
of others affects individuals’ occupational choices and subsequent evading decisions.
In one treatment individuals receive information about the highest tax evasion rates of
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others in past experimental sessions with no such social information; in another treat-
ment they receive information about the lowest tax evasion rates observed in the past
sessions with no such social information. We observe an asymmetric effect of social
information on tax compliance. Whereas examples of high compliance do not have any
disciplining effect, we find evidence that examples of low compliance significantly
increase tax evasion for certain audit probabilities. No major differences are found
across countries.
Keywords Tax evasion · Social interactions · Peer effects · Cross-country
comparisons · Experiments
JEL Classification H26 · D83 · C91
1 Introduction
Tax evasion is a worrisome phenomenon, in particular in times of economic crises
when tax bases decline while needs increase. Albeit its social and economic impor-
tance and the recent expansion of research on tax evasion (Alm 2012) we still
have limited knowledge of the determinants of this informal phenomenon (see
Andreoni et al. 1998; Slemrod 2007). Tax evasion has often been studied as a
rational decision making process under risk. According to this economics-of-crime
approach, tax evasion is considered as a gamble with a probability of detec-
tion leading to sanctions. However, following the formal model of Allingham and
Sandmo (1972), it has been shown that tax compliance cannot be entirely explained
by the risk of deterrence and economic factors. Indeed, the Allingham-Sandmo
model predicts a compliance rate much lower than what we actually observe. In
this context, understanding tax morale—i.e., the intrinsic willingness of individu-
als to comply with the tax law—becomes crucial to explain the large differences
between theoretical predictions and what is actually observed (Torgler 2007; Alm
2012).
It is conceivable that individual tax morale depends on the behavior of others in
society. Indeed, many decisions made by individuals are influenced by the examples
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given by their peers 1 and similarly, we can hypothesize that individual tax behav-
ior depends on the compliance of others in society and is affected by social norms
(Myles and Naylor 1996; Alm and Torgler 2006; Fortin et al. 2007; Torgler 2007;
Cummings et al. 2009; Alm 2012; Fonseca and Myles 2012). Relatedly, people with
reference-dependent preferences may be influenced by others’ behavior if this behav-
ior constitutes a reference point. 2 Recently, field experiments have found evidence
supporting the broken windows theory of Wilson and Kelling (1982). It has been shown
that signs of disorder or littering induce the spreading of more disorder and littering
when people can observe that others have violated a social norm (see notably Keizer
et al. 2008). A critical mass model has also been suggested when some individuals
take part in an activity only if a high enough fraction of the population is engaged in
the activity (Schelling 1978). This model would suggest that in the domain of taxes,
a high level of compliance in the group may discipline individuals, while a low level
of compliance may discourage them from behaving honestly.
In this paper we are interested in how individuals’ tax compliance responds to
social information, i.e., information about others’ tax compliance. Theoretically, the
effect of social information has been shown to lead to coordination on social norms
(Gordon 1989; Myles and Naylor 1996; Kim 2003; Traxler 2009). In the tax com-
pliance context it means that if many people are evading taxes, individual taxpayers
also have a greater incentive to evade taxes. Myles and Naylor (1996) have explored
theoretically the critical proportion of tax evaders that would be sufficient to push
an individual into evasion. A few attempts have been made to study empirically the
effect of social information on tax compliance. In an experimental study, Fortin et al.
(2007) tested the impact of a group’s mean reported income on tax compliance. Their
results point to a fairness effect but do not detect an endogenous social information
effect. In a recent large-scale natural field experiment people were required by law
to pay a fee for receiving public broadcasting but could also receive the channels
without paying the fee (Fellner et al. 2013). The authors manipulated the information
about actual levels of compliance but did not find a significant treatment effect. The
actual compliance levels in this study were very high (94 %) suggesting that providing
such information has little effect. It remains, however, unknown whether informa-
tion about lower or very low compliance rates would also have no effect. Fonseca
and Myles (2012) observed a very weak effect of communication (in the sense of a
reinforced compliance) among non-student subjects but not for students. They also
find a negligible impact on compliance of public announcements about the number
of evaders who have been caught in an environment where subjects are not informed
about audit rates. All this evidence suggests a very limited effect of social infor-
1 This has been observed in various fields, such as schools achievements (Sacerdote 2001; Zimmerman
2003), recreational activities(Bramoullé et al. 2009), contribution to public goods (Fischbacher et al. 2001),
consumption (Moretti 2011), labor supply (Aaronson et al. 1999), effort at work (Falk and Ichino 2006;
Mas and Moretti 2009; Bandiera et al. 2009; Beugnot et al. 2013), quitting decisions (Rosaz et al. 2012),
participation in retirement plans (Saez and Duflo 2003), or criminal activities (Glaeser et al. 1996; Keizer
et al. 2008).
2 For an application of reference-dependent preferences to reporting behavior, see Heinemann and Kocher
(2013) who study the impact of a regime shift from a progressive toward a proportionate tax tariff on tax
evasion.
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mation. On the other hand, studying social externalities when auditing resources are
congested, using a large dataset of small businesses and professionals in Italy, Galbiati
and Zanella (2012) measure a large social multiplier. These contrasting results show
the need for further investigations of the influence of social information on individual
behavior.
In this paper, we explore how a different informational content—namely good
versus bad examples—influences individual tax compliance in an environment with
recursive interactions. We use a laboratory experiment, because it allows us identifying
social information effects in a controlled way. Indeed, the available administrative data
and household surveys on tax behavior are often not accurate and informative enough
for such identification. There are also several econometric problems related to the
identification of social information effects using field data. In particular, it is not trivial
to identify precisely the definition of the influence group. Even if the peer group is well
defined and exogenously composed, it is difficult to identify separately the different
sources of interdependent behavior when people interact in groups simultaneously
(Manski 1993). The controlled environment offered by the laboratory enables us to
address these issues by randomly assigning individuals to groups and by controlling
the flow of information.
In our experiment, like in Gerxhani and Schram (2006), subjects have to choose
in isolation between a “registered” random income, the realization of which will be
known to the tax authority for sure and taxed accordingly, and an “unregistered” ran-
dom income that will only be known to the tax authority with some probability. If
subjects choose the unregistered income, after being informed on their actual income,
they have to decide on whether reporting this income or not. In case of not reporting,
they risk a fine for underreporting. To study the influence of the social information
of others’ reporting behavior, we have designed two variants of the previous situation
that allow us to compare the impact of a high level (that we call “good” examples)
and a low level of compliance (that we call “bad” examples). In these treatments with
social information, before making their decisions, subjects receive information about
the behavior of peers in past sessions with no social information. More precisely, they
learn the minimum or maximum proportion of subjects in the same situation in past
sessions, chose the unregistered income and the minimum or maximum proportion
of subjects who reported their income. In half of the sessions with social informa-
tion, we conveyed the minimum proportions, and in the other half the maximum
proportions observed in past sessions with no social information. In this way, sub-
jects receive social information about the behavior of others that may influence their
own behavior regarding tax evasion. This recursive method of identification avoids
the reflection problem that hinders the identification of peer effects when individuals
and groups interact simultaneously (see also Bellemare et al. 2010; Beugnot et al.
2013).
Importantly, subjects were not informed that these values corresponded to extreme
values (minimum or maximum), so that we can compare the sensitivity of behavior
to the two types of social information in a controlled way. This was implemented in a
non-deceptive way (see below).
We conducted the experiment in Belgium (Flanders and Wallonia), France, and the
Netherlands. This allows us to investigate compliance behavior across different cultural
123
Tax evasion and social information 405
settings when holding both institutions and information constant in order to increase the
generalizability of our results. Flanders and Wallonia in Belgium share the same social
and fiscal institutions but not necessarily the same values and social norms. Languages
are the same in Wallonia and France and in Flanders and the Netherlands, shaping
potential cultural similarities and differences. In this respect our study contributes to
the recent experimental literature on cross-country studies of tax evasion (Alm et al.
1995; Alm and Torgler 2006; Gerxhani and Schram 2006; Torgler and Schneider 2007;
Cummings et al. 2009; Lewis et al. 2009).
Our findings reveal an asymmetric effect of social information on individuals’ tax
compliance. When individuals receive information that corresponds to the lowest eva-
sion rates of their peers, tax compliance does not increase. This suggests that “good
examples” of high compliance have no disciplining effect on tax evasion. In contrast,
we find evidence that individuals’ compliance is affected negatively when they receive
information that corresponds to the highest evasion rates of their peers. Especially,
when the audit probability is relatively high observing that many individuals evaded
taxes leads to higher tax evasion. This finding is consistent with the “broken window”
theory and with social learning. Across countries we find some differences in tax eva-
sion that are consistent with the Eurobarometer (European Commission 2007). How-
ever, social information about the highest evasion rates tends to wipe out cross-country
differences.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the exper-
imental design and the procedures, and it presents our predictions. Section 3 reports
the experimental results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Experimental design and predictions
2.1 Experimental design
Our experiment consists of a No-Information treatment and two variants of a social
Information treatment. The design of the baseline condition was inspired by Gerxhani
and Schram (2006) and consists of three stages repeated for 30 periods. In the first stage
of each period, subjects choose their source of income by taking either a “registered”
income (a salaried job), the realization of which will be known to the tax authority
for sure, or an “unregistered” income (a self-employed job) that will be known to the
tax authority only with some probability. This is intended to replicate the finding of
Schmölders (1960) and Alm and Torgler (2006) showing that self-employed workers
have lower tax morale than salaried workers. Each job lasts one period and is associated
with various possible gross incomes. In a salaried job, gross income can take one
of the values 200, 300, 450, 550, 650, or 750 points, each equally likely (expected
gross income = 483.33), while in a self-employed job it can take one of the values
150, 200, 350, 550, 750, or 850 points (expected gross income = 475). The standard
deviation of income is larger in the self-employed job than in the salaried job, as
observed in the field. We acknowledge that in the field in some professions the expected
gross income can also be higher in self-employed jobs than in salaried jobs. We did
not implement this because we wanted to make sure—at least for risk averse and
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Table 1 Gross and net payoffs in points by type of job
Salaried job
Gross income 200 300 450 550 650 750
Net income 150 225 337.5 412.5 487.5 562.5
Self-employed job
Gross income 150 200 350 550 750 850
Net income if reported 112.5 150 262.5 412.5 562.5 637.5
Net income if no report and no audit 150 200 350 550 750 850
Net income if no report and audit, F = 50 25 50 125 225 325 375
Net income if no report and audit, F = 75 0 25 100 200 300 350
risk-neutral subjects—that the choice of the self-employed job is motivated by the
possibility of evading taxes and not by a higher expected gross income.3
In the second stage, after the subjects have made their choice between a salaried
job and a self-employed job, the computer program selects a gross income at random.
The salaried wage is automatically taxed at 25 %.4 If the individual has chosen a self-
employed job, he has to make a second choice between reporting and not reporting
his income.5 A reported income is taxed at 25 %.
In the third stage, an audit occurs with a probability p, with p ∈ { 16 , 14 , 12
}
, depend-
ing on the auditing condition.6 If an unreported income is detected, the gross income
is taxed at 25 %, and a fine has to be paid. The fine amounts to 25 % of the gross
self-employment income plus a fixed amount F , with F ∈ {50, 75} depending on the
fine condition in the respective period. This manipulation of the fixed cost allows us to
vary the cost of detection. Before choosing between a salaried job and a self-employed
job, in each period subjects are informed about the values of p and F prevailing in that
period. At the end of each period, they are informed whether they have been audited
and get to know their net payoff. Table 1 displays the payoffs associated with each
possible situation.
2.1.1 The social information treatments
In the No-Information treatment, subjects do not receive any information on others’
behavior. However, in field settings people may be informed on what others do, and
3 In Gerxhani and Schram (2006) the expected gross income is also higher in the salaried job than in the
self-employed job.
4 This aims at capturing the fact that in salaried jobs tax evasion is made impossible by the fact that
employers report the wage paid to the employees to the tax authorities.
5 Alternatively, we could have asked the players to choose the amount to be reported. For the sake of
simplicity, we only offered a binary choice.
6 In our experiment, like in most experiments on tax evasion, audit probabilities are higher than in the field.
We note, however, that we are mainly interested in identifying how behavior adjusts to variations in the
audit probabilities and not so much in its precise values. Moreover, tax authorities are usually not revealing
the true audit probabilities (Alm 1988). Hence, perceived audit probabilities are largely subjective and may
be overweighed by individuals.
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this social feedback may influence their behavior (see Wilson and Kelling 1982; Keizer
et al. 2008). To investigate the influence of such information, we have implemented
two social information treatments. In these treatments, before making their occupation
decision, subjects are informed on the proportions of subjects who chose the salaried
job and the self-employed job, respectively, in previous sessions for the same audit
probability and fixed fine. In addition, after learning their gross income, subjects who
chose the self-employed job are informed on the proportion of individuals in some
previous sessions who made the same choice, received the same gross income, and
chose to report it, and the proportion of those who, in the same conditions, chose not
to report their income. This recursive information method of identification eliminates
any reflection problem that would otherwise impair the identification of endogenous
peer effects (Manski 1993).
Two variants of this treatment have been implemented. In some sessions, we imple-
mented the “Info-Min condition,” in which we displayed the minimum proportion of
subjects choosing the self-employed job ever observed in any session played under the
No-Information condition. Thereafter, for those who chose self-employment, we also
displayed the minimum proportion of people choosing to engage in tax evasion, i.e.,
not reporting their self-employed income, ever observed in past sessions of the No-
information condition. This Info-Min condition aims at measuring how the example of
high compliance influences individuals’ behavior. In contrast, in the “Info-Max con-
dition” information is given about the maximum proportion of subjects choosing the
self-employed job ever observed in any past session of the No-information condition.
Those who chose self-employment were also informed about the maximum proportion
of people choosing to evade taxes in previous sessions of the No-information condi-
tion. This Info-Max condition aims at measuring how the example of low compliance
influences individuals’ behavior. Importantly, in order to avoid any confound as, e.g.,
experimenter demand effects, subjects were not informed of the fact that they saw
extreme values observed in previous session. In both conditions they received exactly
the same instructions (see online appendix).7 The implemented variation in social
information also allows us to investigate whether high and low compliance examples
7 The instructions said: “You also receive information on the decisions of participants who in some previous
experiments were in the same conditions as you are now. More precisely, before making your decision, you
are informed on the proportion of participants who chose the salaried job and the proportion of those who
chose the self-employed job in previous experiments for the same audit probability and the same fixed
amount of the fine as you.” They also stated: “In these previous experiments the rules were the same as in
this experiment, except that the participants did not have such information.” We have chosen this phrasing
carefully in order to avoid deception. We did not inform subjects that they saw extreme values of previous
sessions, but according to Hey (1998) and Hertwig and Ortman (2008) withholding information should
not be considered as deception, whereas providing subjects with wrong information should be viewed as
deception. Moreover, fully disclosing that the information contained extreme values would have confounded
the comparison between the two conditions, because the informational contend would have been different.
Our subjects received exactly the same instructions in both conditions of the social information treatment.
Comparing the effect of explicit versus implicit social information is, however, an interesting question
which could be explored in future research. See also Jamison et al. (2008) for an interesting study on the
negative impact of using deception regarding the identity of interacting partners.
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have a symmetric effect on behavior.8 The proportions presented to the subjects in the
two conditions can be found in the online appendix.
2.1.2 Pre- and post-experimental questionnaires
While it has been found that the likelihood of tax evasion is associated with the degree
of risk aversion (Andreoni et al. 1998; Kirchler 2007; Torgler 2007), it is unknown
whether risk preferences mediate the influence of social information on individual
compliance behavior. To investigate this, we elicited our participants’ risk preferences
at the very beginning of the session, using the Holt and Laury (2002) paired lotteries
procedure (see also Cohen et al. 1987).9 No feedback on lottery outcomes was given
to subjects until the very end of the session, so that the outcome of this task could not
influence behavior in the tax evasion game.
At the end of each session, we recorded individual demographic characteristics
and elicited opinions toward tax evasion and illegal work and political orientations. A
few questions were taken from the Eurobarometer survey on undeclared work in the
European Union European Commission (2007).10 We also included questions on tax
morale taken from the Taxpayer Opinion Survey (United States 1987).11 Finally, we
control for cognitive reflection of our subjects in a parsimonious way using the three
question version of the Cognitive Reflection Test by Frederick (2005).
2.2 Predictions
In line with the related experimental literature (Gerxhani and Schram 2006), in the fol-
lowing we assume that individuals are expected utility maximizers. In the salaried job
expected gross earnings amount to 483.33 points (SD = 208.97; min = 200; max = 750)
and to 475 points (SD = 289.40; min = 150; max = 850) in the self-employed job. If
incomes are reported, in the salaried job expected net earnings amount to 362.5 points
and to 356.25 points in the self-employed job. Therefore, for a risk-neutral individual,
the choice of the self-employed job should be only motivated by the possibility of tax
evasion. When F = 50, the expected net earnings from not reporting are 427.08 points
for p = 1/6, 403.13 for p = 1/4, and 331.25 for p = 1/2. When F = 75, the cor-
responding expected net earnings from not reporting are 422.92, 396.88, and 318.75
8 The two conditions are directly comparable, since we used the same instructions. Only the indicated
proportions can possibly influence behavior. This would not have been possible if we had indicated that
these proportions correspond to minimum or maximum values.
9 Subjects made ten successive choices between two paired lotteries, “option A” and “option B” (see online
appendix). The payoffs for option A are either e2 or e1.60 and those for the riskier option B are either
e3.85 or e0.10. In the first decision, the high payoff in both options has a probability of one tenth, and this
probability increases by steps of one tenth as the number of the decision increases. Risk neutrality should
lead subjects to cross-over from option A to option B at the fifth decision, while risk-loving individuals are
expected to switch earlier and risk-averse individuals later.
10 In particular, we asked subjects to which extent they find a series of behaviors related to fraud acceptable
or not using a ten-point Likert-type scale (see online appendix).
11 Subjects had to rate on a scale from 1 to 6 their feelings regarding the degree of acceptability of
statements about tax fraud (see online appendix).
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points. This indicates that a risk-neutral player who plans to evade should choose the
self-employed job when the probability of an audit is lower than 1/2 and the salaried
job otherwise, regardless of the fixed amount of the fine.12 Using the Constant Relative
Risk Aversion utility function and parameters such as calculated in Holt and Laury
(2002), it can be shown that an average risk-averse player will choose the salaried job
for p = 1/2 and p = 1/4, but will choose either the salaried job or the self-employed
job when p = 1/6 depending on his degree of risk aversion. In contrast, a risk-seeking
individual will choose the self-employed job for p = 1/6 and p = 1/4, but he will opt
for the salaried or the self-employed job when p = 1/2 depending on his degree of
risk seeking, regardless of the value of F .
Information on the behavior of others in previous sessions may affect individ-
ual decisions. Myles and Naylor (1996) argue that individuals can be better off
from following the standard behavior in the group due to social conformity and
social learning effects. The effect of information about others’ behavior may also
be related to emotional perceptions (see Coricelli et al. 2010) and may reduce the
reluctance of individuals to cheat when they observe that many other people misbe-
have. This corresponds to the broken windows effect or to the critical mass model
effect.
Finally, individuals may have a taste for tax compliance reflecting cultural values.
Behavior may, therefore, differ across countries (see Alm and Torgler 2006; Schneider
2007; Halla and Schneider 2013).
2.3 Procedures
Our experiment was conducted in three countries and four different locations: the
Behavioral & Experimental Economics Laboratory (BEElab) at Maastricht Univer-
sity (The Netherlands), the Catholic University of Leuven (Belgium, Flanders), the
Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE-CNRS) in Lyon (France), and
the University of Liège (Belgium, Wallonia).13 This was unknown to the subjects. The
experiment was computerized using the REGATE-NG software developed at GATE
(Zeiliger 2000). In all locations, students were recruited from undergraduate classes in
economics and business only, by means of the ORSEE software (Greiner 2004). Only
Dutch students participated in the Maastricht sessions, Flemish students in the Leuven
sessions, Walloon students in the Liège sessions, and French students in Lyon. In total,
257 subjects (43.58 % female) took part in 17 sessions. Details of these sessions are
given in Table 2. Each subject participated only once.
In order to make sure that people understood that not reporting one’s income means
cheating on taxes, the instructions were deliberately phrased in non-neutral terms (see
12 These predictions hold for any income level. Hence, learning one’s own actual income should not change
the decision to report or not to report it. However, for the minimum gross income of 150 points, F = 75 and
p = 1/4, the subjects should be indifferent between reporting or not, as the expected earnings are 112.50
in both cases.
13 In Lyon and Maastricht, we could use experimental labs. In Leuven and Liège, we used large lecture
halls and a mobile lab, with enough space between participants to ensure confidentiality of decisions.
123
410 M. Lefebvre et al.
Table 2 Details of the experimental sessions by location
Location conditions Belgium Flanders Belgium Wallonia France The Netherlands Total
No-Information 23 (2) 19 (1) 33 (2) 24 (2) 99 (7)
Info-Min 20 (1) 17 (1) 20 (1) 19 (1) 76 (4)
Info-Max 22 (1) 19 (1) 20 (1) 21 (3) 82 (6)
Total 65 (4) 55 (3) 73 (4) 64 (6) 257 (17)
% of female subjects 41.54 36.36 52.05 42.19 43.58
The numbers are those of subjects. The numbers of sessions are in parentheses
online appendix).14 The instructions and the text shown on the computer screens have
been written first in English. Then native speakers translated them into Dutch and
French. A reverse translation into English has finally been done, and adjustments
were made in each language to maximize the comparability between the French and
Dutch instructions. The instructions in Dutch were used in Leuven and Maastricht;
those in French were used in Liège and Lyon. With the help of local assistants, the
same bilingual experimenter conducted all sessions at the four different sites to avoid
experimenter effects across sites.
To ensure comparability across sites we used the same random sequence of audit
probabilities, fixed amounts of fine, and gross incomes in all four locations. To deter-
mine the values to be displayed in the Info-Min and the Info-Max conditions of the
social information treatment, we ran first all sessions with the No-Information treat-
ment. We then identified for each audit probability and each value of the fixed fine the
minimum and the maximum proportions of participants choosing self-employment.
Similarly, we determined the minimum and maximum proportions of individuals
reporting and not reporting their income for each level of gross income in the self-
employed job.
Upon arrival, each subject was randomly assigned to a computer. The instructions
for the first part (i.e., risk preference elicitation) were distributed and read aloud by
the experimenter. After their questions were answered in private, subjects made their
ten lottery choices. When all subjects had completed this part, we distributed and
read aloud the instructions for the tax evasion part. A comprehension questionnaire
was administered to check that the rules of the experiment were well understood. All
questions were answered in private. Once the 30 periods of this part were completed,
the computer screens displayed the post-experimental questionnaire. Then, at the end
of the session, subjects were paid their earnings in a separate room and in private. In
the payout room, we first played the lottery of the Holt and Laury task. Each subject
rolled a ten-sided die to determine which decision number would be played for real.
For the selected decision, the subject rolled the die again for determining the payoff
in the chosen lottery.
For the tax evasion part of the experiment, we applied a conversion rate of 100
experimental points to 3 Euros. Two of the 30 periods were randomly drawn for
14 We used notions like income, tax, audit, and fine. The instructions did not include any loaded terms such
as fraud, cheating, or tax evasion.
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Table 3 Distribution of choices per condition and country




59.44 (49.11) 57.09 (49.51) 60.50 (48.89) 65.05 (47.69) 60.64 (48.85)
No-Information 61.01 (48.81) 50.53 (50.04) 60.10 (48.99) 63.75 (48.11) 59.36 (49.12)
Info-Min 52.50 (49.98) 48.43 (50.02) 62.67 (48.41) 64.91(47.77) 57.37 (49.46)
Info-Max 64.09 (48.01) 71.40 (45.23) 59.00 (49.22) 66.67 (47.18) 65.20 (47.64)
Percentage of
evaders
38.72 (48.72) 36.48 (48.15) 42.60 (49.46) 43.96 (49.65) 40.65 (49.12)
No-Information 38.84 (48.77) 28.42 (45.14) 42.22 (49.42) 44.03 (49.68) 39.23 (48.83)
Info-Min 35.83 (47.99) 34.51 (47.59) 42.50 (49.48) 48.42 (50.02) 40.44 (49.09)
Info-Max 41.21 (49.26) 46.32 (49.91) 43.33 (49.59) 39.84 (48.99) 42.56 (49.45)
The numbers refer to proportions of subjects. These proportions are obtained from the total number of
subjects by treatment and/or condition (see details in Table 2). The percentage of evaders is not conditional
on having chosen the self-employment. Standard deviations are in parentheses
payment at the end of the session. Average earnings were 16.89 Euros (SD = 4.69),
including a 3 Euros show-up fee. A session lasted on average 52 minutes, excluding
payment.
3 Results
First, we give an overview of the choices of tax evasion by location and informa-
tion condition. This descriptive analysis is followed by a regression analysis of the
determinants of tax compliance.
3.1 Descriptive analysis
Table 3 displays the average percentage of individuals who chose the salaried job and
self-employment, respectively, as well as the percentage of evaders related to the total
number of subjects in each condition.
Table 3 shows that overall, 60.64 % of the subjects choose an occupation that allows
for tax evasion (59.36 % in the No-Information condition alone). Interestingly, 32.96 %
of these subjects report their income nevertheless (33.92 % in the No-Information
condition alone), which is not in line with the theoretical predictions for risk-neutral
individuals. This behavior could possibly be attributed to mental accounting, assigning
different statuses to the two sources of money (income and evaded taxes), to isolation if
subjects valuate separately each of the two stages of the decision process, or to excess
optimism if subjects choose self-employment not because it offers the perspective of
tax evasion but in the hope of receiving the maximum possible net income (i.e., 637.50
with the self-employed job and 562.50 with the salaried job).
Theoretically, risk-neutral subjects should not evade when the audit probability is
50 % and should not comply for lower audit probabilities. Observed behavior differs
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Fig. 1 Relative frequency of evaders relative to the total number of subjects by information condition and
audit probability
significantly from this prediction, showing evidence of risk-seeking behavior when
the probability of an audit is high and risk-averse behavior when the probability is low
or medium. However, comparative statistics show the theoretically predicted changes.
Overall, 4.4 % of the individuals evade taxes when the audit probability is 1/2, 45.2 %
when it is 1/4 and 72.3 % when it is 1/6. The probability of evasion is significantly
different from 0 when the audit probability is 1/2 (t tests with each individual as a unit
of observation, p < 0.001). This probability is systematically different from 100 for
the other audit probabilities (p < 0.001). These probabilities of evasion according to
audit probabilities are all significantly different one from another (p < 0.001).
Social information does affect behavior. The percentage of participants who choose
the self-employed job is significantly higher in the Info-Max condition than in the
No-Information treatment (Mann–Whitney tests,15 M–W hereafter, p = 0.065 for
all the countries pooled together, and p = 0.004 for Wallonia) and than in the Info-
Min condition (M–W, p = 0.052 for all countries and p = 0.007 for Wallonia).
There is no difference between No-Information and the Info-Min conditions (M–W,
p = 0.807). There are also no significant differences in the percentages of evaders
across conditions, except for Wallonia (M–W, p = 0.008). The picture is somewhat
different when considering audit probabilities. Figure 1 displays the relative frequency
of evaders (stricto sensu, i.e., relative to the total number of subjects regardless of their
occupational choice) by information condition and audit probability.
We find a statistically significant effect of the Info-Max condition compared to
the No-Information treatment on the proportion of evaders, except when the audit
probability is low (M–W, p = 0.075 when the audit probability is 1/2, and p < 0.001
15 All Mann-Whitney non-parametric tests reported in this paper are two-tailed. The mean choice of each
subject across periods is taken as one independent observation.
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when the audit probability is 1/4). There is no significant difference between the Info-
Min condition and the No-Information treatment for any audit probability. When the
probability is low (p = 1/6), there is no significant difference between any pair of
the information conditions. We attribute this to the fact that for the very low audit
probability, the percentage of cheaters has already reached a maximum in the No-
Information treatments. We also test for treatment differences regarding the effect of
different fine levels but do not detect any significant effects.
Overall, the statistical analysis indicates that only the bad example of low compli-
ance (Info-Max condition) has an effect on the level of tax evasion, whereas the good
example of high compliance (Info-Min condition) does not have any effect. These
results support a broken windows effect or the critical mass model in the tax evasion
context, at least when the audit probabilities are not too low.
When comparing across countries and regions, Table 3 suggests that the percent-
age of individuals who choose the self-employed job is higher in France and the
Netherlands than in the Belgian regions. Pairwise tests indicate that only Wallonia
and the Netherlands differ significantly (M–W, p = 0.027 when all data are pooled
and p = 0.040 for the No-Information treatment only).16 Looking at the proportion of
evaders stricto sensu, Wallonia has the lowest proportion closely followed by Flanders.
The difference is significant between Wallonia and France (M–W, p = 0.066 when
all data are pooled, and p = 0.015 for the No-Information treatment) and between
Wallonia and the Netherlands (M–W, p = 0.021 and p = 0.005, respectively). There
is no difference between the two Belgian regions.
3.2 An econometric analysis of the impact of social information on tax evasion
We supplement the above basic analysis with an econometric investigation of the
determinants of tax evasion and the effects of the two forms of social information.
This allows us to explore the relative importance of the various possible determinants
of the decision to evade taxes. The decision in our experiment comprises two steps: first,
the choice of the occupation and second, the decision to evade taxes. Theoretically,
the choice of the occupation should already explain the decision to evade (or not).
However, the above basic analysis has shown that a fraction of subjects who chose
the self-employed job nevertheless reports their income. Therefore, we estimate a
two-stage probit model with a correction for a potential sample selection bias. In the
first step, we estimate the determinants of the occupational choice by means of a
random-effects Probit model. In the second step, we explain the probability to evade,
conditional on the choice of self-employment, with another random-effects Probit
model. Table 4 displays the results17.
16 The difference between Wallonia and the Netherlands is no longer significant when we correct p-values
for multiple testing.
17 We include random effects to control for the lack of independence between observations, because each
individual is observed 30 times. The use of a panel method is justified, as confirmed by the significance
of the ρ coefficient in table 4 which rejects the inexistence of unobserved individual level heterogeneity.
Another way of correcting for the lack of independence of observations within individuals would be to
consider our panel as a special case of clustered data such that errors are correlated over time for a given
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Audit policy
High fixed fine −0.342∗∗∗ −0.204∗∗∗ −0.213∗∗∗ −0.214∗∗∗ −0.214∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
Audit probability: 1/6 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Audit probability: 1/4 −1.169∗∗∗ −0.685∗∗∗ −0.832∗∗∗ −0.834∗∗∗ −0.832∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.089) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117)
Audit probability: 1/2 −3.045∗∗∗ −2.159∗∗∗ −2.506∗∗∗ −2.517∗∗∗ −2.509∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.341) (0.397) (0.398) (0.398)
Condition
No-Information Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Info-Min −0.134 0.150 0.038 0.384 0.384
(0.183) (0.145) (0.159) (0.323) (0.323)
Info-Min*Audit
probability 1/4




– – 0.310 0.310 0.308
(0.210) (0.211) (0.211)
Info-Min*Flanders – – – −0.551 −0.560
(0.430) (0.430)
Info-Min*France – – – −0.663 −0.674
(0.421) (0.425)
Info-Min*Netherlands – – – −0.065 −0.070
(0.427) (0.427)
Info-Max 0.302∗ 0.002 −0.104 0.339 0.332
(0.180) (0.141) (0.153) (0.301) (0.302)
Info-Max*Audit
probability 1/4




– – 0.355∗ 0.354∗ 0.349∗
(0.208) (0.208) (0.209)
Info-Max*Flanders – – – −0.501 −0.518
(0.405) (0.409)
Info-Max*France – – – −0.415 −0.414
(0.397) (0.397)
Info-Min*Netherlands – – – −0.751∗ −0.755∗
(0.398) (0.398)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual characteristics
Gross income – 0.080∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Male 0.125 0.207∗ 0.217∗ 0.244∗ 0.243∗
(0.161) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126)
Age −0.019 −0.030∗ −0.030∗ −0.034∗∗ −0.035∗∗
(0.020) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Safety index –H.&L. −0.122∗∗ −0.097∗∗ −0.100∗∗ −0.094∗∗ −0.095∗∗
(0.051) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Self-reported risk attitude 0.154∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.076∗∗ 0.075∗∗
(0.043) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Cognitive performance 0.150∗ 0.096 0.095 0.110 0.111
(0.085) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068)
Relative wealth −0.025 – – – –
(0.037)
Country
Wallonia Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Flanders 0.053 0.054 0.064 0.404 0.420
(0.225) (0.174) (0.175) (0.288) (0.290)
France 0.343 0.589∗∗∗ 0.603∗∗∗ 0.974∗∗∗ 0.995∗∗∗
(0.228) (0.182) (0.183) (0.288) (0.289)
Netherlands 0.351 0.227 0.243 0.532∗ 0.550∗
(0.229) (0.177) (0.178) (0.287) (0.289)
Opinions
Rich pay too much taxes – – – – 0.063
(0.123)
Cheat if get away – – – – 0.051
(0.122)
Pay in cash – – – – −0.001
(0.122)
Tax evasion – – – – −0.056
(0.177)
Period 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Inverse Mills’ ratio – −0.022 0.072 0.078 0.074
(0.228) (0.239) (0.240) (0.240)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 1.994∗∗∗ 1.087∗∗ 1.143∗∗ 0.890∗ 0.859∗
(0.627) (0.481) (0.484) (0.503) (0.514)
N 7710 4675 4675 4675 4675
L.L. −2741.25 −2167.70 −2165.25 −2160.95 −2160.64
Wald 2274.3 726.99 727.44 732.77 733.37
Rho 0.567*** 0.403*** 0.405*** 0.394*** 0.393***
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % level, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Info-Min condition, Info-Max condition, audit probability 1/4 and 1/2, high fixed fine, Flanders, France,
the Netherlands, and male are dummy variables. The gross income takes the value of the perceived income
divided by 100. The safety index is given by the number of times the participant has chosen the safe
option A in the Holt and Laury lottery and can take any integer value between 0 and 10 (ex ante measure).
The self-reported risk attitude takes a value between 1 (risk averse) and 9 (willing to take full risks)
(ex post measure). Cognitive performance indicates the number of correct answers in the three questions
of the Cognitive Reflection test. The opinion on “Cheat if get away” and on “Pay in cash” can take a value
between 1 (this behavior is perfectly acceptable) and 6 (this behavior is not at all acceptable). The opinion
on “Tax evasion” is coded in the opposite direction: 1 indicates that the behavior is absolutely unacceptable,
while 10 indicates that it is absolutely acceptable. The opinion on “Rich pay too much taxes” is coded 1 if
the participant answered “agree” or “strongly agree” to the following statement: “Rich pay too much taxes,”
and 0 otherwise
The first equation models the choice of occupation. The binary dependent variable
indicates whether the individual has chosen to be self-employed (value = 1) or not
(value = 0). The independent variables include dummy variables for each audit prob-
ability (with probability 1/6 as the reference) and for the high fine in case of detected
tax evasion. They also comprise dummies for the Info-Min and the Info-Max con-
ditions (with the No-Information treatment as the reference)18. Potentially important
time-invariant individual characteristics are also included: gender, age, cognitive per-
formance (as measured by the number of correct answers in the Cognitive Reflection
Test), relative family wealth, and risk preferences. Risk preferences are captured both
by the safety index given by the number of safe choices in the Holt and Laury task
and by self-reported risk preferences for which a low value indicates, in contrast to the
safety index, higher risk aversion.19 The last set of independent variables consists of
Footnote 17 continued
individual. This approach has, however, the disadvantage of being less efficient. In the appendix (Table 5)
we provide estimation results of this approach and find that the results are similar to those presented here.
18 We do not use the actual proportions of those who have chosen the self-employment job or the proportions
of evasion presented to the subjects, since they were absent in the No-Information treatment. Moreover
information on past tax evasion was only presented to those who chose the self-employment occupation.
By introducing dummy variables for the Info-Min and the Info-Max conditions, we directly control for the
effect of receiving information on peers’ “good” and “bad” behavior.
19 Only ten subjects switched more than once between the two option choices in the Holt and Laury task.
In case of multiple switches, the safety index has been calculated as the mean switching point. We have also
performed the same estimation when withdrawing the observations from these ten individuals; the results
are qualitatively the same.
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dummies for each location (with Wallonia as the reference category) and a time trend
to control for a possible learning effect over time.
In the second step, we estimate four specifications of the decision to evade taxes
that we present successively. In specification (1) we add to the other independent
variables the inverse of the Mill’s ratio taken from the first-step regression to control
for a potential selection bias (this variable is in fact never significant, indicating that
there is no selection bias) We also include the subject’s gross income obtained from
the choice of being self-employed, instead of the self-reported wealth family indicator.
The results of these first two models show that both likelihoods to choose the self-
employed job and, conditional on this choice, to evade taxes decrease with higher
fines and higher audit probabilities (compared to an audit probability of 1/6). The
negative impact of audit probabilities and fines is consistent with previous experiments
and with evidence based on survey data (Friedland et al. 1978; Dubin et al. 1990;
Slemrod et al. 2001). As for individual characteristics, we find that both elicited and
self-reported risk attitudes consistently indicate that more risk-averse players are less
likely to choose the self-employed job and, conditional on this choice, to evade taxes.
Cognitive performance as measured by the CRT test only increases the probability
to choose the self-employed job. Gender affects only the tax evasion decision, with
men more likely to evade than women as previously observed in the literature (Spicer
and Becker 1980; Baldry 1986). Moreover, a higher realized income increases the
probability to evade taxes. After controlling for the deterrence policy factors and
individual characteristics, the likelihood of choosing the self-employed job and the
likelihood of evasion are similar across Belgian regions and the Netherlands, but
they are significantly higher in France. This result is similar to the one reported in
the Eurobarometer survey (European Commission 2007). Social information affects
significantly individuals’ decision to choose the self-employed job, but conditional on
this choice, it has no significant effect on the decision to evade taxes, regardless of the
nature of social information. This result is in consistent with previous studies who also
find weak effects (Fortin et al. 2007; Fonseca and Myles 2012; Fellner et al. 2013).
However, as suggested by the descriptive statistics, the effect of social informa-
tion could be affected by the deterrence measures the individuals face. To explore
this, specification 2 of the tax evasion regression in Table 4 introduces interaction
effects between each social information condition and the audit probabilities. The
results show that high compliance by others has no significant effect on individual
choice regardless of the audit probability. In contrast, the probability of tax evasion is
significantly higher when subjects are given examples of low compliance by others.
This effect is marginally significant when the audit probability is intermediate (1/4)
or high (1/2). There is no significant difference between the Info-Max condition and
the No-information treatment when the audit probability is 1/6. Since we control for
individual risk preferences, this suggests that “bad” social information does not affect
those who have a strong tax morale (those who do not evade even when the audit
probability is low).20
20 We also tested for interaction effects between risk attitude (as given by the Holt and Laury test) and
the social information conditions as well as for interaction effects between risk attitude, social information
conditions, and the audit probability. The results showed that those who are more risk averse are less likely
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Specification 3 in Table 4 introduces interaction terms between each social informa-
tion condition and each country. In the No-Information condition there are differences
in tax evasion across locations, with French subjects evading more than Wallonians.
Examples of low compliance increase the level of tax evasion in all regions except
the Netherlands where social information tends to reduce the likelihood to evade. It
should be noted that the combined effect of audit probability and the Info-Max condi-
tion remain significant after controlling for the interaction between this condition and
the location.
Finally in specification 4, we also control for individual opinions. We include a
binary measure of an individual’s opinion regarding progressive tax policies (labeled
“Rich pay too much taxes”).21 We also control for subjects’ opinions on tax morale
and undeclared work by considering the degree of unacceptability of three statements
presented in the post-experimental questionnaire.22 These questions are added here to
control for possible differences in terms of fraud acceptability. We are aware of that
these variables may suffer from a potential endogeneity and/or justification bias and
results should be interpreted with caution. In fact, none of these opinion variables have
a significant effect, while the other results still hold.
4 Discussion and conclusion
We have conducted a laboratory experiment in Flanders and Wallonia in Belgium,
France and the Netherlands to identify the influence of social information on the
decision of individuals to evade taxes. To measure this influence in a controlled
and unbiased way, we have (a) controlled the composition of the group of peers
and (b) disseminated social information in a recursive way by using behavior of
other participants who previously participated in our experiment and made their deci-
sions without receiving social information. With this method, our target individuals
could be exposed to information about behavior of others while avoiding that the
latter could be influenced also by the former. This avoids the reflection problem
which often impairs the identification of endogenous peer effects when using field
data.
Footnote 20 continued
to evade when they are given good examples of compliance than those who are less risk averse. On the
other hand, those who are more risk averse are more inclined to evade tax, when the audit probability is
higher, and they receive information on low level of compliance. These regression results are available upon
request.
21 This variable is coded 1 if the subject has agreed or strongly agreed with the following statement:
“The rich have to pay too much taxes”, and 0 otherwise.
22 The three statements are “Almost every taxpayer would cheat to some extent if s/he thought s/he could get
away with it” (labeled “Cheat if get away” hereafter); “Being paid in cash for a job and then not reporting it
on your tax form” (labeled “Pay in cash” hereafter); “Someone evades taxes by not or only partially declaring
income” (labeled “Tax evasion” hereafter). The first two statements are taken from the TOS survey and are
rated on a scale from 1 (perfectly acceptable) to 6 (perfectly unacceptable). The last statement is taken from
the Eurobarometer and is rated in the opposite direction from 1 (absolutely unacceptable) to 10 (absolutely
acceptable).
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The most important result of our study is that social information on others’ tax
compliance has an asymmetric influence on individuals’ behavior. Individuals do not
change their tax compliance behavior when they are exposed to the “good example”
of the highest rates of compliance previously observed. In contrast, when exposed to
the “bad example” of the lowest rates of compliance previously observed individuals,
tax compliance gets worse. This holds for all investigated audit probabilities, except
the lowest one.
This asymmetric endogenous peer effect is not consistent with the critical mass
theory à la Schelling that would predict an effect of both good and bad examples
on individual behavior. It is compatible with two other ideas of social influence. The
so-called broken window theory asserts that individuals feel less committed to behave
well when they observe that many others do not behave well. Bad examples would
be more influential than good examples, because the former provide a reinforcing
self-justification to individuals to act dishonestly without altering their self-image.
In contrast, good examples may give bad conscience, and so dishonest people may
tend to simply ignore them or reinterpret them in their own favor. Another idea of
social influence relates to social learning; in our game for most subjects equilib-
rium behavior would be to evade taxes except when the audit probability is high.
Some individuals may feel more confident to evade taxes when a large proportion
of others is doing so, because they may believe that others have a better perception
of the appropriate decision under risk. Both ideas of social influence seem plausi-
ble. However, social learning cannot fully explain the observed behavior, because
we also found that when the audit probability is low, individuals do not evade taxes
more when they learn that a high proportion of their peers evaded. Since this result
holds even after controlling for individual risk preferences, it suggests that individu-
als who do not evade even when the risk of being caught is low are motivated by a
stronger tax morale and that they are less likely influenced by the bad examples of
others.
The asymmetric social information effect evidenced in our study complements pre-
vious analyses of social norms on tax compliance. In comparison with Fortin et al.
(2007) who estimate linear-in-means models of compliance and find no endogenous
peer effects, we show that social reference points can matter. Overall, one may not
observe a strong impact of mean evasion rates by others if people are only influenced
by “bad” examples that reduce the psychic cost of evading. This pleads for the use
of other models than the linear-in-means model that is usually used in the literature
to study peer effects. Compared to notably Alm and Torgler (2006), Cummings et
al. (2009), Torgler (2007), and Torgler (2007) who have shown that cross-country
differences in tax compliance can be partly explained by differences in the over-
all attitude toward governments, our results suggest that cross-country differences
may be attenuated by the dissemination of social information. This suggests further
research on how social information may—or may not—reduce the disparities in com-
pliance due to different citizens’ attitudes toward governments. Finally, our results
complement those of Fonseca and Myles (2012) who observed a negligible impact
on compliance of public announcements about the number of evaders who have been
caught when subjects were not informed about the audit rates. This may be seen as
support of our interpretation that the asymmetric effects we observe in our experi-
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ment are not due to social learning but rather due to a self-justification of dishonest
behavior.
One should be careful with extrapolating our findings to the population of taxpayers
for several reasons. We have explored only a small range of parameters in the audit
policy with relatively high audit rates, and we have artificially formed the groups
of peers. It is certainly perceivable that in the field social information has a stronger
impact when individuals know who the reference group members are or when behavior
is reinforced through feedback loops. Still, our findings point toward the importance
of not ignoring the existence of peer effects when studying tax compliance behavior.
This also holds for policies designed to deter tax evasion. In particular, our results
suggest that disseminating information about the extent to which people comply with
taxes may not encourage higher compliance; if it exerts an influence on compliance,
this influence may rather be negative than not positive. Finally, a possible limitation
of our study is that our subject pool consists of students with no or little experience in
paying taxes, and behavior of students and taxpayers can differ (see notably Fonseca
and Myles 2012).
Our results suggest several avenues of future research. A natural extension of our
study would consist of collecting more data without social information to explore the
impact of even lower and even higher evasion rates than implemented here. Indeed,
a broader range of values regarding the lowest and highest evasion rates would allow
to determine both a lower threshold of evasion with a disciplining effect and an upper
threshold above which the “broken window” effect would emerge. Moreover, while our
design is static, it would be interesting to study how the impact of social information
would change if subjects received information about increasing highest compliance
rates over time.23 Further research should also investigate the nature of endogenous
social interactions on tax compliance to disentangle the influence of social learning
from that of conformity. Another interesting extension would consist of identifying
which individuals are more likely to be influenced by social information and which
are less likely to be under the influence of others. It would be also useful to explore the
impact of other types of information, for example, the frequency at which peers have
been audited, as we can suspect that individuals may perhaps be more influenced by
this information. In our study social information homogenizes behavior across regions
but the cross-country differences were initially limited. It would be also interesting to
study whether social information has the same influence when countries hold more
different institutions and cultures. Finally, in our experiment the decision to evade or
not was binary. It would be interesting to extend the study to a continuous decision
framework.
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5 Appendix: Supplementary regressions
See Table 5.





(1) (2) (3) (4)
Audit policy
High fixed fine −0.242∗∗∗ −0.136∗∗ −0.161∗∗ −0.170∗∗∗ −0.168∗∗
(0.034) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067)
Audit probability: 1/6 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Audit probability: 1/4 −0.819∗∗∗ −0.470∗∗∗ −0.623∗∗∗ −0.658∗∗∗ −0.652∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.167) (0.192) (0.193) (0.193)
Audit probability: 1/2 −2.125∗∗∗ −1.671∗∗∗ −2.075∗∗∗ −2.196∗∗∗ −2.176∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.602) (0.644) (0.643) (0.645)
Condition
No-Information Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Info-Min −0.065 0.100 0.044 0.354 0.355
(0.122) (0.112) (0.131) (0.225) (0.223)
Info-Min*Audit
probability 1/4




– – 0.059 0.080 0.079
(0.239) (0.243) (0.245)
Info-Min*Flanders – – – −0.374 −0.379
(0.333) (0.332)
Info-Min*France – – – −0.651∗∗ −0.644∗∗
(0.307) (0.311)
Info-Min*Netherlands – – – −0.123 −0.129
(0.321) (0.319)
Info-Max 0.235∗∗ −0.020 −0.097 0.300 0.301
(0.117) (0.117) (0.128) (0.222) (0.222)
Info-Max*Audit
probability 1/4




– – 0.351 0.364 0.355
(0.260) (0.258) (0.261)
Info-Max*Flanders – – – −0.433 −0.443
(0.322) (0.326)
Info-Max*France – – – −0.407 −0.405
(0.289) (0.289)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Info-Min*Netherlands – – – –0.617∗∗ −0.622∗∗
(0.305) (0.303)
Individual characteristics
Gross income – 0.064∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Male 0.055 0.160 0.171∗ 0.201∗ 0.199∗
(0.102) (0.104) (0.102) (0.103) (0.103)
Age −0.014 −0.016 −0.017 −0.023∗ −0.023∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Safety index –H.&L. −0.077∗∗ −0.063 −0.071∗ −0.064 −0.064
(0.034) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Self-reported risk attitude 0.106∗∗∗ 0.040 0.049 0.058∗ 0.057∗
(0.033) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Cognitive performance 0.110∗∗ 0.059 0.068 0.083 0.086




Wallonia Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Flanders 0.053 0.016 0.029 0.308 0.317
(0.153) (0.131) (0.128) (0.254) (0.257)
France 0.271∗ 0.343∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗ 0.765∗∗∗ 0.774∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.148) (0.145) (0.231) (0.229)
Netherlands 0.270∗ 0.093 0.125 0.410∗ 0.414∗
(0.141) (0.154) (0.150) (0.234) (0.234)
Opinions
Rich pay too much taxes – – – – 0.055
(0.092)
Cheat if get away – – – – −0.001
(0.101)
Pay in cash – – – – 0.004
(0.097)
Tax evasion – – – – −0.001
(0.150)
Period 0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Inverse Mills’ ratio – −0.162 0.076 0.152 0.134
(0.514) (0.530) (0.528) (0.529)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 1.349∗∗∗ 0.868∗∗ 0.853∗∗ 0.580 0.560
(0.419) (0.367) (0.368) (0.387) (0.399)
N 7710 4675 4675 4675 4675
L.L. −3603.17 −2465.59 −2462.66 −2440.48 −2439.68
Pseudo R2 0.303 0.168 0.169 0.177 0.177
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % level, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Info-Min condition, Info-Max condition, audit probability 1/4 and 1/2, high fixed fine, Flanders, France,
the Netherlands, and male are dummy variables. The gross income takes the value of the perceived income
divided by 100. The safety index is given by the number of times the participant has chosen the safe
option A in the Holt and Laury lottery and can take any integer value between 0 and 10 (ex ante measure).
The self-reported risk attitude takes a value between 1 (risk averse) and 9 (willing to take full risks) (ex
post measure). Cognitive performance indicates the number of correct answers in the three questions of the
Cognitive Reflection test. The opinion on “Cheat if get away” and on “Pay in cash” can take a value between
1 (this behavior is perfectly acceptable) and 6 (this behavior is not at all acceptable). The opinion on “Tax
evasion” is coded in the opposite direction: 1 indicates that the behavior is absolutely unacceptable, while
10 indicates that it is absolutely acceptable. The opinion on “Rich pay too much taxes” is coded 1 if the
participant answered “agree” or “strongly agree” to the following statement: “Rich pay too much taxes,”
and 0 otherwise
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